World War III will not be fought with bombs and munitions as in previous global conflicts, but with viral attacks such as COVID and cyber hacks that even now, are having a crippling effect on many institutions.
So says Richard A. Muller, a 34-year Jason National Security adviser and professor of physics emeritus at the University of California, Berkeley, whose books include “Physics for Future Presidents” and “Energy for Future Presidents.”
In a widely-published commentary, he noted: “This isn’t some far-fetched disaster scenario cooked up by Hollywood screenwriters. Biological and cyber viruses have been, in a sense, field-tested. The great value to the attacker of a two-pronged biological and cyber attack is the possibility of achieving destructive goals while keeping the whole operation covert.”
According to Muller, Vladimir Putin’s losses in Ukraine and the rebellion of the Wagner Group, the mercenaries he’s used to help wage the war, have increased the chances that the Russian president will lash out and expand the 17-month-old conflict. “But World War III may not be what you expect,” he continues. “The current paradigm of escalating nuclear conflict was articulated 60 years ago by physicist Herman Kahn, founder of the Hudson Institute, but other technologies have come a long way since then. Conventional guns, bombs, missiles or troops may not figure in World War III at all. Biological and computer viruses are likely to be the weapon of choice.”
Noting that early COVID panic came from Italy’s inability to care for all of its infected patients, Muller explained that for maximum disruption, the second thrust of any aggression might be a cyberattack on hospitals, perhaps disguised as ransomware. Again, the trick would be to make it seem as if the attack were originating outside the aggressor’s country. In other contexts, this is called a “false flag” operation. The target country might not even recognize it as part of a two-front, synergistic attack of biological and computer viruses.
Ransomware could simultaneously target energy grids, power plants, factories, refineries, trains, airlines, shipping, banking, water supplies, sewage treatment plants, and more. But hospitals would be the most salient targets, Muller went on. Avoiding obvious military targets would enhance the illusion that World War III hadn’t begun. The attacker or attackers might falsely claim their own systems are also under siege. Misdirection can be more effective than a smoke screen.
 |
| File Photo |
If deterrence fails and an attack takes place, correctly identifying the perpetrator has to be the first priority, according to Muller. This may or may not be easy, butretaliating against the wrong actor risks making an already bad situation worse. Reopening the COVID-19 origin investigation would provide good practice. Confiscation of the foreign assets of the attacking nation could be effective. A strong cyberattack capability aimed at the enemy’s military and industry is key. Hospitals should be spared, lest the victim of an attack appear to become the aggressor and lose the moral high ground.
There are many reasons why an adversary may want to launch a covert attack on the U.S. economy. America’s leaders need to take seriously the prospect that their country could be defeated without being invaded or even knowing it is under attack. “The way to deter such an attack is to convince potentially hostile actors that success is impossible and the consequences for the attacker will be swift and severe,” Muller advised. “The U.S. needs to make it clear that its commitments to North Atlantic Treaty Organization allies, Ukraine, Taiwan and others won’t waver even if the American economy falters.”
Muller was also a faculty senior scientist at the Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory and has a distinguished career with Jason, an independent group of elite scientists that advises the U.S government on matters of science and technology, mostly of a sensitive nature. The group was created in the aftermath of the Sputnik launch as a way to reinvigorate the idea of having the nation's preeminent scientists help the government with defense problems, similar to the way that scientists helped in World War II, but with a new and younger generation.