“This is not an invasion of Cambodia. The areas in which these attacks will be launched are completely occupied and controlled by North Vietnamese forces. Our purpose is not to occupy the areas. Once enemy forces are driven out of these sanctuaries and once their military supplies are destroyed, we will withdraw.”
- President Richard M. Nixon
Almost 55 years ago, the United States under Nixon ordered the expanded bombing and the incursion into Cambodia. As we currently watch the strength of the Ukrainians to strike against the Russians through the capture of towns, bridges, and railroad line, incursions can alter the advances of aggressor forces. As the United States fought in the final phase of the Vietnam War, it had fewer soldiers, with no significant reinforcements, Nixon ordered one of the final offensives in Southeast Asia.
In 1970, as American soldiers were being withdrawn through the “Vietnamization” of our military forces from South Vietnam, there was the concern that this nation was militarily weakened. Many believed that the South Vietnamese was unable to handle the threat of the North Vietnamese Army and the Vietcong using the Ho Chi Minh Trail and the establishment of Communist sanctuaries in Cambodia and Laos. The enemy enjoyed a long-standing freedom of movement, supply bases, and
safety for their soldiers who were not widely retaliated against from American land forces.
The North Vietnamese were concerned about the political developments in Cambodia as Lon Nol led a bloodless coup against the power of Prine Norodom Sihanouk in Phnom Penh. This pro-Western leader demanded that all Communist forces were to leave this nation. Whereas, Hanoi watched the reduction of American forces, they refused to leave Cambodia and invaded this country with additional forces. The North Vietnamese and Vietcong were vulnerable, as ports were closed to their shipping that supported Communist soldiers within the nearby war in South Vietnam. The North Vietnamese and the Khmer Rouge overran the eastern and northeastern sections of Cambodia and were stationed within 20 miles of its capital.
At this juncture, Nixon was in a hard spot, the war was long and costly, the results were hard fought, but the Communists remained in South Vietnam with louder American calls to end of this war. But the United States still had combat soldiers that were ordered into the field to support Saigon to prevent a Communist takeover. General Creighton Abrams was one of the finest officers to ever lead Americans as he cemented his presence as an armor commander during the Battle of the Bulge in
the winter of 1944-1945. He was a respected figure who handled Civil Rights integration and was a brilliant tactician, honest, and capable officer. Through every position that Abrams commanded from graduating the West Point Military Academy in 1936 to being named the senior commanding military figure in South Vietnam, he was a decisive leader who was concerned about the enemy in this country. By 1970, the American troop strength was 330,000 American soldiers, and by the following year, it would be decreased in half to about 150,000 soldiers in 1971. Nixon ordered Abrams to create an American strike into Cambodia to weaken the Communist presence against this leadership, support American and South Vietnamese soldiers in the field, and to protect the Saigon government.
During the American anti-war protests, Abrams ordered the largest joint attack into Cambodia since 1967. Armed with 50,000 South Vietnamese and 30,000 American soldiers, the main objective was to advance into the Cambodian territory that was only 40 miles from Saigon. Abrams directed three different assaults, as the first was waged toward the Cambodian Fishhook and Parrot’s Beak to target enemy soldiers. Secondly, there were operations from the Central Highlands into Cambodia and the third wave’s main goal was to oppose the Communists at the
Mekong River near Phnom Penh.
Armed with tanks, trucks, the air cavalry, and fully armed soldiers, the Americans and South Vietnamese were ordered to advance into Cambodia. Abrams planned to pressure the enemy, trap soldiers from retreating, and to capture enemy weapons, food, and ammunition. Operating against a surprised enemy, Americans captured prisoners of war, some of which were North Vietnamese and Vietcong children who were part of the Communist effort. VFW Post 6249 Commander Joseph A. Cognitore was a platoon commander who was ordered into Cambodia. Cognitore vividly recalled his experience with this movement and stated, “We were flown by helicopter into Cambodia and saw no difference within the jungle landscape, nor did we come across any villages. This operation
was a shock, as the enemy lost hospitals, supply depots, and parts of the Ho Chi Minh Trail. This American victory at the end of the war limited the ability of the North Vietnamese and Vietcong to attack our forces.”
As Nixon was highly criticized for the claim that he was expanding the war, it was one of the last American offensive abilities of this war to thwart the mobility and tenacity of this enemy force. Although this was the first war that the United States lost, this operation revealed that when the battles rules were lifted, that the American military leadership had the ability to hurt the North Vietnamese and Vietcong. Abrams was successful in creating a plan that hurt Communist leadership against enemy safe havens that were rarely hit from ground forces.